

To: 1985 NES Pilot Study Committee  
From: Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman  
Subject: Morality Items on the 1985 Pilot Study

As you may remember, our goal in developing the set of morality items for the pilot study was to construct a measure reflecting people's positions on a general dimension of traditional (conservative) to modern (liberal) moral values. We wanted to do this while avoiding an excessively topical or issue specific measure. Since the historical evidence suggests that conflicts over morality have been a recurring feature of American politics, we would like to have a measure that will not become quickly dated and that will not be so tied to a small set of contemporary issues that it will cease to be useful when new issues tied to morality emerge. On the basis of a small pre-test ten Likert format questions were included on the pilot study, five in the first interview and five more in the second. The exact wordings of the questions and the resulting response distributions are given in Table 1. (Since half of the morality items were asked in the reinterviews, only those respondents who completed both waves of the pilot study are considered in this analysis, N = 306.) As can be seen, the most specific referents in these questions involve things like divorce, people living together unmarried, loose living, and the traditional family. It seems unlikely that these will cease to be associated with debates over morality anytime in the near future. The frequencies show a decided tendency toward "agree" responses across all the questions; this is similar to what we have obtained for the Likert items used in the equality and economic individualism measures. However, only a few of the distributions are so skewed that lack of meaningful variance may be a problem. The distributions do underline the need to insure that any measure based on Likert-type items be balanced with equal numbers of "agree" and "disagree" questions.

## Item Analysis and Scale Properties

An initial examination of the matrix of inter-item correlations indicated that V7105 (People who don't care if they have a steady job...) does not hang together with the other items; it was quickly discarded. All of the other nine items showed acceptable item-total correlations. In a second step, the items were correlated with a large number of potential criterion variables (issue preferences and feeling thermometers) to determine if any of the questions consistently failed to relate to variables that most others in the set did. Besides the already suspect V7105, V7104 (It's good for children to be exposed to ...) was the only item that repeatedly deviated from the pattern of the other items. This question also has one of the lowest item-total correlations in the set. Eliminating this question leaves eight items, four in the agree direction and four in the disagree direction. The mean inter-item correlation for these eight is .26 with an estimated reliability (coefficient alpha) of .74. If the two items in each direction with the lowest item-total correlations are dropped (V8105 and V8103), the remaining questions have a mean inter-item correlation of .29 and an estimated reliability of .72. (Note: although coefficient alpha is always a lower bound on the true reliability it is a much worse estimate when response set bias is present; the "true reliability" of the eight and six item scales is almost certainly much higher than is indicated here.)

Since the items are obviously skewed in the agree direction and Likert format items have long been accused of being beset by agreement response set, it is worth considering the potential impact of this on any resulting morality scale. (Determining the actual nature and effects of agreement response set turns out to be a surprisingly difficult problem, as a review of over 30 years of research will quickly show. It is only possible to present an initial discussion of this here. More on this will be forthcoming in relation to the

equality and economic individualism scales.) First, it should be noted that having some skewed items is actually useful since it helps to identify those respondents with more extreme views. Second, the presence of agreement response set means that it is essential to balance the direction of the items in the scale so that the variance due to the response set will tend to cancel itself out across a series of items. Third, if it is assumed that variance in the tendency to agree with Likert items is relatively orthogonal to views on morality, it becomes possible to estimate the extent to which each "factor" influences each item. This is done simply by examining the loadings of each item on the first two factors from an unrotated solution of a factor analysis. Loadings on the first factor should represent the influence of the general dimension of morality and loadings on the second factor the effect of agreement response set. (The assumption of orthogonal factors is perhaps somewhat more suspect in the case of morality than for some other substantive dimensions. Still, it is probably a reasonable approximation for present purposes. Use of a more flexible estimation procedure such as LISREL would allow this assumption to be relaxed.) Table 2 shows the results of such a factor analysis. The first factor shows that the remaining eight items all tap the same substantive dimension to an acceptable degree. The second factor shows that agreement response set is present but in most cases the effects are small compared to the substantive factor (the signs of the loadings simply indicate the direction of the question wording.) It is interesting to note that there is not a powerful relationship between the extent of skewness in the response distributions and the influence of response set. Items may be skewed for reasons other than agreement response set; the relative extremity of the item and social desirability are two other possible reasons. The eigenvalues from this analysis show that the first, substantive factor

accounts for about two and a half time the variance in the set of items than does the response set factor.

One final check on the problem of agreement response set is to form two four item scales, each with only the items worded in one direction, and examine the correlations between these two sub-scales and various criterion variables (again, policy preferences and feeling thermometers). If response set really is a substantive problem there should be some clear differences in the correlations between the criterion variables and the two scales. This is an interesting analysis for a second reason as well. In order to avoid making people disagree with a negatively worded statement, the direction of the question wording also corresponds to a substantive difference in the questions: one set represents conservative or traditional moral views the other set reflects more liberal or modern positions. It could be argued that there are really two distinct dimensions here, artificially forced together (which is the conclusion one might come to if the two factor solution were arbitrarily rotated). Fortunately, this is not the case. Across a large number of criterion variables there was no obvious pattern of differences in the observed correlations between the two halves of the scale. In some cases one of the pair of correlations was larger and in other cases the other was, but there was no discernible pattern to this. It is also interesting to note that the two sub-scales correlate at  $r = .44$  despite the fact that this construction maximizes the effects of agreement response set and thus introduces a negative covariance between the scales as a result of methods variance.

With all items coded on a 0 - 1 interval, the eight item morality scale has a mean of .5 and standard deviation of .18. Moreover, the skewness is almost zero and the kurtosis very low indicating that the scale nicely approximates a normal distribution. We would therefore conclude that while

there is evidence of agree response set in the individual items it is not a severe problem when the questions are combined into a single scale. The items all tap a common substantive dimension, the scale is fairly reliable, and, despite the distributions of the individual items, the scale has good variance and is not at all skewed.

#### The Determinants of Moral Values

Although this is not the place to go into an extended analysis of the determinants of views on morality some examination is required in order to proceed with multivariate analysis and to be assured that the measure created here is not redundant with other variables already included in the instrument we are using. The following is therefore not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the sources of variation in morality. Since moral values are likely a complex outgrowth of early socialization, social interaction, social context, and lifestyle, a really detailed analysis could be difficult, perhaps requiring variables outside of those typically included in the National Election Studies.

For this analysis, and the analysis to follow, the eight item morality scale will be used, coded 0 to 1 with high scores indicating more liberal or modern moral values. Since morality is likely to be strongly related to religious variables, three measures of religious belief and practice were constructed. The first (Fundamentalist Beliefs) was created from four items in the 1984 interview asking about the role of religion in the respondent's life (is it important, does it provide guidance, is the person "born again") and whether they believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible. It is coded 0-1 with high scores indicating strong religious beliefs. The second, Protestant Sect, is coded 1 if the respondent is a member of a fundamentalist protestant church, 0 otherwise. And the third measure

(Church) is self-reported frequency of attendance at church services, coded from 1, every week, to 0, never. Several social background variables are also included: Education, in years; age, in years; income, in thousands of dollars; gender, 1 if female, 0 if male; race, 1 if nonwhite, 0 if white; region, 1 if south, 0 otherwise; and occupation, 1 if professional, 0 otherwise. In order to examine possible early socialization effects four additional variables were included: size of place of upbringing, coded 1 if farm or small town, 0 otherwise; whether the respondent's mother had a job when they were growing up, coded 1 if job 0 if not; father's occupation, coded 1 if professional, 0 if not; and mother's occupation, coded 1 if professional, 0 if not.

The results of regressing the morality scale on the this set of independent variables are (coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses):

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Morality} = & .82 - .16 \text{ Fundamentalist Belief} + .00 \text{ Protestant Sect} \\
 & \quad (.03) \quad \quad \quad (.03) \\
 & - .09 \text{ Church} - .004 \text{ Education} - .002 \text{ Age} - .002 \text{ Income} \\
 & \quad (.03) \quad \quad (.004) \quad \quad (.0005) \quad \quad (.0006) \\
 & - .01 \text{ Female} + .05 \text{ Nonwhite} + .05 \text{ Professional} - .03 \text{ South} \\
 & \quad (.02) \quad \quad (.03) \quad \quad (.02) \quad \quad (.02) \\
 & - .03 \text{ Size} + .03 \text{ Mother Job} + .04 \text{ Father Occupation} \\
 & \quad (.02) \quad \quad (.02) \quad \quad (.03) \\
 & + .02 \text{ Mother Occupation} \quad \quad R^2 = .35 \\
 & \quad (.04)
 \end{aligned}$$

Clearly, conservative views on morality and strong religious beliefs are strongly related. Fundamentalist religious beliefs is the best predictor of conservative moral values (standardized beta = -.30) and frequency of church attendance is also a good predictor (beta = -.17). Besides religion, several other factors are related to morality, age being the most important (beta = -.22). Holding constant all other factors in the model, older people are

substantially more conservative morally than younger people. Income also emerges as a significant predictor of morality but in an odd way: holding all else constant, higher incomes are related to more conservative moral values (beta =  $-.17$ ). On the other hand, education bears little relationship to morality. Of the other variables in the model only occupation exerts much influence, with professionals more liberal on morality than nonprofessionals (beta =  $.12$ ), but the coefficient here is not terribly large. Although they are all in the expected direction, living in the south, growing up in a small town or on a farm, and parents' occupations do not bear much relation to moral values. This does not necessarily mean that early socialization experiences are unimportant, but possibly that the variables we used are inadequate to tap this. (Certainly early experiences with religion should be important and these may be captured in this model through the continuity of religious views from childhood to adulthood.)

At a minimum, this analysis shows that it is critical to control for religious variables, age, and income in attempting to assess the impact of moral values on any dependent variables. Moreover, the close relationship between morality and religion means that some care must be employed in drawing conclusions about the influence of either on political issues and evaluations. It must clearly be demonstrated that correlations between morality and any dependent variable is not just spurious effect of religious belief. On the other hand, it is also possible that much of what has been interpreted as a growing influence of religion in political life may in fact be do to the role of traditional moral values rather than religious beliefs per se.

#### The Impact of Moral Values on Political Issues and Evaluations

Having shown that the morality scale has good measurement characteristics and is not simply a byproduct of religious beliefs, it is now time to turn to

the question of whether moral values (and this particular scale) are of real value in understanding the sources of political preferences and evaluations. Does the scale hold up as a predictor controlling for other variables already included on our survey instrument? In order to assess this, a large number of regression equations were estimated with various issue preferences and feeling thermometer scores taken as dependent variables. In all the regressions to follow, 12 independent variables were included in addition to the morality scale in order to exert fairly strong controls. The independent variables used, and their codings, are as follows: morality, coded 0-1 with high scores indicating more liberal moral values; equality and economic individualism, also coded 0-1 with high scores indicating stronger commitments to these values; party identification and ideological self-identification, both 0-1 with high scores being strong republicans and strong conservatives; fundamentalist religious beliefs, 0-1, high scores indicating strong religious beliefs; being a member of a fundamentalist protestant church, 1 if yes, 0 if no; frequency of church attendance, 1 = every week to 0 = never; gender, 1 if female, 0 male; race, 1 if nonwhite, 0 white; age in years; education in years; and income in thousands of dollars. In addition, the other variables used to predict moral values were also tried in many of the regression models with virtually no effect on the results. To avoid complicating the presentation of the results any more--and to retain some degrees-of-freedom in the models--we have tried to restrict the independent variables to those most obviously relevant to assessing the usefulness of the morality scale. In all the following tables, unstandardized regression coefficients are presented with standard errors in brackets; standardized coefficients are in parentheses below.

#### Social Issues and Group Evaluations

The most obvious place to start an examination of the effects of moral values is with the domain of social issues. For many, concerns such as abortion, the women's movement, and gay rights seem almost synonymous with moral values, although religious beliefs are often implicated here as well. The 1984 post-election interviews and the second wave of the pilot study contain several feeling thermometers asking for evaluations of groups directly involved in contemporary social issues: evangelical groups like the moral majority, homosexuals, anti-abortionists, and the women's liberation movement, from 1984; the women's movement, people who oppose abortion, and feminists, from the pilot study. The regressions of these seven feeling thermometer scores on the set of independent variables just described is given in Table 3. As can be seen from the first column, evaluations of homosexuals are very closely bound up with morality. The difference in feelings toward homosexuals between the most conservative and most liberal ends of the morality scale is a full 60 degrees. Only equality and gender make any significant contribution to attitudes toward gays once you control for morality. The effects of moral values on attitudes toward the women's movement are not quite as large as in the previous case but still substantial. In all three cases--the women's liberation movement, the women's movement, and feminists--the effects of morality are clear. The coefficient for morality is only slightly exceeded by equality for the women's liberation movement, and it is easily the strongest for the other two. Of these first four groups, only in the case of feminists do any of the religious variables play a role in determining evaluations. And here the effects are mixed: those who attend church services frequently are more negative toward feminists, while those with more fundamentalist religious beliefs are somewhat more positive (holding constant morality and the other variables in the model).

The story is different when it comes to groups opposed to abortion.

Here, religion does come into play with large coefficients for church attendance in both cases and a significant coefficient for being a member of a fundamentalist Protestant sect in the case of anti-abortionists. The impact of morality is less clear. It has a substantial coefficient for evaluations of "people who oppose abortion" but a nonsignificant coefficient for "anti-abortionists." Whether the difference in wording is important here or the relative placement of the items is (the first is on the pilot study the second on the post-election wave of 1984) is not clear. (A few other more minor differences between these two sets of results are also apparent but not easily explained.) Finally, evaluations of the moral majority show pronounced effects of both moral values and religion. Here is one place where the fundamentalist religious belief measure does make a real impact as does membership in a fundamentalist Protestant church; church attendance itself is less important.

Table 4 shifts from evaluations of groups to issue preferences. Several social issue questions are available on the data set: seven point scale placements on women's role and government efforts on behalf of women, positions on the abortion issue and prayers in public schools (all from the 1984 NES), and a question from the pilot study on support for the death penalty. Both of the seven point questions on women's equality show the same influence of moral values as was seen before although the coefficients are somewhat smaller here than were observed for the group evaluations. The question on abortion also parallels the previous results with little effect of the morality scale but a strong influence of religion (church attendance and fundamentalist beliefs). The school prayers issue appears to be influenced both by moral values and by fundamentalist religious beliefs. The large coefficient for equality is somewhat surprising here. Finally, moral concerns

are also evident in positions on the death penalty despite the small amount of variance on this issue. It is also interesting to note that, with moral values held constant, those with fundamentalist religious beliefs are more opposed to the death penalty than those who do not subscribe to these beliefs.

These results from the social issues domain are interesting in several respects. First, the influence of the morality scale is evident in many of these issues. The women's rights issues, gay rights, the death penalty, and prayers in public schools are all influenced by the dimension of morality being measured here. Second, for many of these issues religion is not an important predictor once moral values are taken account of. Someone studying the effects of religion on social issue preferences and evaluations would therefore draw erroneous conclusions if a measure of moral values were not included in the analysis. Finally, it is clear that social issues are not all of one piece. Some are most decidedly matters of morality, some are more clearly religious concerns, and others combine the influence of both morality and religion. Only an analysis with both sets of variables can draw out these important distinctions.

#### Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues

In the case of social issues the expectations concerning morality (and religion) were relatively clear (if oversimplified). Such is not the case for domestic and foreign policy issues. One could construct reasonable arguments for why morality should be important with respect to these issues and for why it should not be. Table 5 provides some empirical evidence to consider. Several domestic and foreign policy issues are available from the 1984 interviews: spending vs. services, jobs and guaranteed standard of living, government medical insurance, relations with Russia, U.S. involvement in Central America, and defense spending (all seven point scales). For both the jobs issue and medical insurance there is no

discernible influence of moral values; both are strongly influenced by commitments to equality. Some effect of morality is seen in the more general spending/services question--those with traditional moral values are somewhat more likely to endorse cuts in government services than are those with liberal moral values--but the coefficient is substantially smaller than that of equality.

A very different pattern is evident in the foreign policy domain, however. The morality scale emerges as a very good predictor of positions on the relations with Russia and the involvement in Central America questions. Those who hold traditional moral values are apparently quite willing to have the U.S. take a tougher stance in relations with the Soviet Union and to get more involved in the internal affairs of Central American nations. They are also somewhat more in favor of increased defense spending than those on the more liberal end of the morality scale but the differences are less here than for Russia and Central America. Two interpretations of these results are worth considering. On the one hand, it is possible that views on morality are correlated with ethnocentrism, patriotism, or something of this sort. If the appropriate "other" factor were included in the analysis perhaps the influence of morality would disappear. On the other hand, it may be that for some people opposition to communism is very much of a moral issue and that is reason enough to get tougher with the Soviet Union and get involved in Central America. For whatever reason, the morality scale is easily the best predictor of responses to the relations with Russia question of the large set of variables considered here.

#### Racial Issues

In some ways the relationship between moral values and racial issues is more interesting than was the case for the social issues--for which the

relationship needed to be strong almost as a matter of validating the scale-- or domestic and foreign policy issues where the expectations were not entirely clear. Without very much empirical evidence, there has been a great deal of speculation that moral concerns underlie racial attitudes. This is has been explicitly mentioned by Kinder and Sears in their definition of symbolic racism and has a longer history in theories of status politics advanced by Lipset, Gusfield, and others. With the abundance of racial items on the pilot study it is an easy matter to investigate this in some detail.

A good indication of the relationship between moral values and racial attitudes can be obtained from the regressions of a series of feeling thermometer scores on the set of independent variables used in the previous analyses. Between the 1984 post-election interviews and the second wave of the pilot study seven feeling thermometers related to race are available. As shown in Table 6, these range from simple evaluations of "blacks" all the way through "black militants." The relationships between these evaluations and the morality scale trace out an interesting pattern. For relatively non-controversial or "mainstream" groups like blacks, working class blacks, and black politicians, there is a significant but not very strong relationship between the morality scale and evaluations in the expected direction: those at the more liberal end of the scale are somewhat more positive toward the black groups than are those at the more conservative end. The effect of morality grows stronger for black young people and black activists, and becomes quite powerful for civil rights leaders and black militants. Apparently, those with more conservative moral views are only somewhat more likely to dislike blacks who are not acting "out of the ordinary" but show increasing hostility for those blacks who actively seek change in politics and society. Put another way, those with conservative moral values most dislike those blacks threatening the status quo. (It is

interesting to note that in those cases in which religion influences racial attitudes it is in a positive direction; holding morality constant, religious beliefs and practices are associated with more favorable attitudes toward blacks.)

The way in which moral values relate to issue preferences on racial matters is shown in Table 7; again the pattern is instructive. The effect of morality is clear on both the seven point scales dealing with racial matters on the 1984 Election Study, government aid to minorities and busing. In both cases the coefficient for morality is large even holding constant race, commitment to equality, party, and ideology. In fact, moral values are just about the best predictor of opposition to busing of the entire set of independent variables considered here. An even better sense of the impact of morality comes from four composite issue questions tapping the gap between respondents' feelings about what the government is doing and should be doing in issues related to race (all coded +1 to -1, with high scores indicating that the government is doing far too much and low scores that the government is doing far too little; see Kinder and Sanders for more discussion of these questions). As can be seen in Table 7, the effect of morality is most evident when it comes to the issue of the government's role in assisting blacks in the housing market. The coefficient for morality is somewhat smaller for school integration, smaller still for job opportunities, and virtually zero for insuring equal rights. Where government assistance to blacks most intrudes on the personal lives of whites, the effect of moral values is strong; where the issue is more abstract and less personally threatening, morality makes much less difference. An experiment in question wording on the pilot study demonstrates nicely the way in which the framing of racial issues influences

reactions toward it. The two issues are preferential treating in hiring and promotion, and admissions quotas for black students. In one form of the questions the opposing position was put in terms of reverse discrimination and in the other form it was phrased in terms of blacks not having earned this treatment (again see Kinder and Sanders for more details). The same regression models were estimated for these four cases (two issues by two forms). Without going into all of the estimates, it is sufficient to note that the influence of moral values is much larger when the issues are framed in terms of unearned advantages than when put in terms of reverse discrimination. The regression coefficients for quotas are  $-.29$  for discrimination and  $-1.91$  for advantages; the corresponding coefficients for preferential treatment are  $-.68$  and  $-1.95$  (both dependent variables scored 1 to 5).

Although we have not attempted anywhere near a full investigation of the ways in which moral values are translated into racial attitudes, some preliminary results are highly suggestive. Morality is strongly related to a scale intended to measure "symbolic racism" (beta =  $-.23$ ) and to a related question on the speed of the civil rights movement (beta =  $-.24$ ). The morality scale also predicts well a scale measuring individualistic explanations of poverty (beta =  $-.26$ ) but is virtually unrelated to explanations having to do with social structural problems or luck.

#### Candidate Evaluations

Finally, it is interesting to see how moral values are related to candidate evaluations (for those of you interested in the bottom line). Table 8 shows some results from the post-election 1984 candidate feeling thermometers. Somewhat surprisingly, evaluations of Reagan and Bush were only slightly affected by moral values despite the President's occasional rhetoric on the subject. Put another way, the generally positive

evaluations of the Republican candidates were only slightly diminished among those with more liberal moral values. The Democrats were not so fortunate. The coefficients for morality are quite large for Mondale and Ferraro even holding constant the usual host of political and demographic variables. In fact, the morality scale is every bit as powerful a predictor of evaluations of Ferraro as is party identification. (In general, evaluations of vice-presidential candidate Ferraro are strongly affected by basic values and beliefs especially in comparison to the more party based evaluations of Bush). Apparently, the Republican candidates managed to avoid losing significant support among those with more liberal moral values while the Democratic candidates suffered significantly among those with more traditional values. Perhaps talking vaguely about traditional moral values while doing nothing concrete on specific social issues is a good campaign strategy (as some would be Republican hopefuls should take notice of). It may also help not to hold your convention in San Francisco if you are the Democrats.

Table 8 also provides results of simulated Reagan-Mondale preferences (by subtracting feeling thermometer ratings of Mondale from those for Reagan). As can be seen, even after party effects are controlled for, both commitments to equality and moral values made sizable contributions to relative preferences in the presidential campaign. The final column in this Table shows a somewhat surprising result given much of the preceding analysis. There is virtually no relationship between evaluations of Jesse Jackson and moral values. Why this is the case is not immediately obvious. Further analysis on other Democratic and Republican politicians (not shown here) yields a pattern similar to the 1984 national candidates--generally morality is more related to evaluations of the Democrats than to evaluations

of the Republicans. Although it is clearly the case that the effects of values in general are much stronger for the candidates for national office than for those not so involved in national media politics.

#### Conclusions and Recommendations

It is rather simple to summarize the results of this analysis. Eight of the ten items included on the pilot study demonstrate good scale properties with a satisfactory overall reliability. Any problems with skewness or agreement response set in the individual items do not seem to have a serious effect on the final measure which contains an equal number of agree and disagree items. A shorter six item scale can be formed with only a slightly lower reliability. The scale predicts well a number of social issues and group evaluations despite fairly rigorous controls for religious and demographic variables. The combination of the morality scale with the religion variables illustrates a differentiation in responses to social issues that would not be apparent if either set of variables were excluded. Moral values also proved to be strong predictors of certain foreign policy positions--relations with Russia and involvement in Central America--and to be interestingly bound up with attitudes on racial matters. In the 1984 presidential campaign, the positions on the morality scale proved to be important determinants of attitudes toward Mondale and, especially, Ferraro.

Given the quality of the measure and the apparent widespread influence of moral values on political preferences and evaluations we strongly recommend that a six or eight item version of this scale be included on forthcoming election studies. There is a long history of morality intruding on politics in this country, often in very significant ways. The salience of social issues does not appear to be ready to decline in the near future and preliminary observation suggests that the intrusion of morality (and religion) into mainstream party politics will only increase in coming years.

TABLE 1  
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS

	Agree Strong	Agree Some	Neither	Dis- Agree Some	Dis- Agree Strong	DK/ NA
V7101 We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are different from our own.	26.8	49.0	0.3	17.3	6.2	0.3
V7102 There is too much sexual freedom and loose living today.	47.4	27.1	2.3	17.0	5.9	0.3
V7103 Changes in lifestyles, such as divorce and men and women living together without being married, are signs of increasing moral decay.	35.9	22.5	1.3	23.5	15.7	1.0
V7104 It's good for children to be exposed to a number of different sets of values so that they can develop their own standards.	24.5	38.6	1.6	17.6	16.0	1.6
V7105 People who don't care if they have a steady job are either lazy, spoiled, or don't want to work.	41.8	29.1	1.6	14.7	11.8	1.0
V8101 The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.	26.1	42.8	0.0	22.5	7.2	1.3
V8102 The world is always changing and we should accomodate our view of moral behavior to those changes.	18.0	43.8	0.0	20.6	17.3	0.3
V8103 There will always be some people who think and act differently, and there is nothing wrong with that.	51.3	39.9	0.0	5.6	3.3	0.0
V8104 Society should be more accepting of people whose appearance or values are very different from most.	29.1	55.2	1.0	9.8	2.3	2.7
V8105 This country would be better off if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.	57.8	34.6	1.0	4.9	1.3	0.3

TABLE 2  
UNROTATED FACTOR ANALYSIS OF MORALITY ITEMS

	Factor 1	Factor 2
VB101	.58	-.17
V7102	.64	-.19
V7103	.73	-.21
VB105	.43	-.13
VB102	.48	.21
V7101	.49	.15
VB104	.46	.22
VB103	.42	.35

Note: Entries are factor loadings (standardized regression weights) for each item on the first two unrotated factors of a principle factors analysis (estimated communalities in the diagonal).

TABLE 3

## SOCIAL GROUP EVALUATIONS

	Homosexuals	Women's Liberation Movement	Women's Movement	Feminists	Anti- Abortionists	People Who Oppose Abortion	Moral Majority
Morality	60.6 [9.9] (.41)	22.6 [8.5] (.19)	36.6 [7.3] (.33)	28.8 [8.0] (.26)	-3.4 [10.3] (-.02)	-24.5 [9.8] (-.17)	-21.7 [9.7] (-.15)
Equality	15.9 [8.9] (.11)	28.3 [7.6] (.23)	15.7 [6.7] (.14)	6.3 [7.3] (.06)	1.7 [9.4] (.01)	-4.7 [8.9] (-.03)	-7.6 [9.0] (-.05)
Individualism	-7.2 [8.6] (-.04)	-4.6 [7.3] (-.03)	-1.4 [6.3] (-.01)	-4.7 [6.9] (-.04)	2.7 [8.9] (.02)	12.7 [8.6] (.09)	6.2 [8.3] (.04)
Party ID	-6.8 [5.0] (-.08)	-8.7 [4.3] (-.13)	1.4 [3.7] (.02)	-6.8 [4.1] (-.11)	5.3 [5.3] (.07)	-.8 [5.0] (-.01)	8.1 [4.9] (.10)
Liberal/ Conservartive	-5.4 [5.8] (-.06)	-1.6 [4.9] (-.02)	-5.2 [4.3] (-.07)	-6.0 [4.6] (-.08)	8.6 [6.0] (.09)	5.4 [5.7] (.05)	11.2 [5.7] (.12)
Fundamentalist Protest. Sect	2.1 [4.7] (.03)	.3 [4.1] (.01)	-1.3 [3.5] (-.02)	.7 [3.8] (.01)	10.9 [4.8] (.14)	-3.2 [4.6] (-.04)	11.8 [4.7] (.15)
Church Attendance	-1.9 [4.7] (-.02)	-5.0 [4.1] (-.09)	-3.2 [3.5] (-.06)	-5.9 [3.8] (-.12)	18.9 [4.9] (.28)	20.0 [4.7] (.30)	7.3 [4.5] (.11)
Fundamentalist Relig. Belief	-1.2 [5.6] (-.02)	1.9 [4.7] (.03)	.1 [4.2] (.00)	9.7 [4.6] (.16)	5.7 [5.8] (.08)	2.3 [5.6] (.03)	13.8 [5.4] (.18)
Gender (female)	10.1 [3.0] (.19)	2.0 [2.6] (.04)	-.1 [2.3] (.00)	1.1 [2.5] (.03)	-.4 [9.4] (-.01)	-2.7 [3.0] (-.05)	2.8 [2.9] (.05)
Race (nonwhite)	-3.1 [5.8] (-.03)	1.6 [5.0] (.02)	14.2 [4.2] (.20)	3.3 [4.6] (.05)	-9.7 [6.2] (-.10)	8.7 [5.7] (.09)	-.8 [5.9] (.00)
Age	.10[.09] (.06)	-.04[.08] (-.03)	.03[.07] (.02)	.10[.08] (.07)	-.14[.10] (-.09)	.08[.09] (.04)	-.22[.09] (-.14)
Education	1.0 [6.0] (.09)	-.1 [5.4] (-.01)	.5 [4.4] (.06)	.8 [5.1] (.09)	-1.0 [6.4] (-.09)	.2 [6.0] (.02)	-.8 [6.0] (-.07)
Income	.05[.10] (.02)	.14[.18] (.09)	.02[.07] (.02)	-.02[.08] (-.01)	.07[.11] (.04)	-.10[.09] (-.06)	-.13[.10] (-.07)
R <sup>2</sup>	.29	.20	.25	.16	.20	.23	.30

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets; standardized regression coefficients are in parentheses below. All dependent variables are feeling thermometer scores ranging from 0 to 100.

TABLE 4  
SOCIAL ISSUES

	(1 to 7) Women's Equality	(1 to 7) Govt Help For Women	(1 to 4) Legalized Abortion	(1 to 5) Prayers In School	(1 to 5) Death Penalty
Morality	-1.05[.66] (-.11)	-1.40[.65] (-.16)	-.39[.47] (-.06)	-1.08[.69] (-.11)	-1.66[.70] (-.17)
Equality	-1.59[.60] (-.17)	-1.57[.61] (-.17)	-.75[.42] (-.11)	-2.36[.63] (-.25)	-1.16[.63] (-.12)
Individualism	.36[.57] (.04)	.24[.57] (.03)	-.27[.40] (-.04)	-.33[.62] (.04)	.20[.61] (.02)
Party ID	.57[.34] (.10)	.10[.34] (.02)	-.05[.24] (-.01)	-.09[.37] (-.02)	.44[.36] (.08)
Liberal/ Conservative	.35[.39] (.05)	.28[.39] (.05)	.13[.27] (.03)	-.23[.43] (-.04)	.39[.40] (.06)
Fundamentalist Protest. Sect	-.02[.31] (-.01)	.08[.31] (.02)	.30[.22] (.09)	.39[.32] (.07)	.14[.33] (.03)
Church Attendance	.36[.32] (.08)	.28[.32] (.07)	.68[.22] (.22)	.42[.33] (.09)	-.20[.34] (-.05)
Fundamentalist Relig. Belief	.69[.38] (.14)	-.03[.37] (-.01)	.40[.26] (.12)	.89[.39] (.18)	-.79[.39] (-.16)
Gender (female)	-.03[.20] (-.01)	-.07[.20] (-.02)	-.16[.14] (-.07)	.17[.22] (.05)	-.29[.21] (-.08)
Race (nonwhite)	-.32[.40] (-.04)	-.49[.38] (-.09)	.41[.27] (.09)	.27[.39] (.05)	-.16[.41] (-.03)
Age	.009[.007] (.08)	.002[.006] (.02)	.005[.005] (.08)	.007[.007] (.07)	-.011[.006] (-.11)
Education	-.08[.04] (-.11)	-.00[.04] (-.01)	.04[.03] (.08)	-.06[.04] (-.08)	-.03[.04] (-.04)
Income	-.015[.007] (-.13)	.001[.007] (.01)	-.008[.005] (-.10)	.016[.007] (.14)	.002[.007] (.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	.24	.13	.18	.24	.11

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets; standardized coefficients are in parentheses below. All dependent variables are coded so that high scores are more "conservative" responses. The range of range of possible responses is given above each dependent variable name.

TABLE 5

## DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

	Spending/ Services	Jobs and Std. of Living	Medical Insurance	Relations With Russia	Central America	Defense Spending
Morality	-1.27[.59] (-.16)	-.37[.62] (-.04)	-.21[.59] (-.02)	-2.60[.74] (-.26)	-1.98[.70] (-.22)	-1.06[.64] (-.12)
Equality	-2.22[.53] (-.27)	-2.74[.58] (-.30)	-1.91[.54] (-.23)	-1.06[.67] (-.11)	-.06[.63] (-.01)	-1.53[.58] (-.17)
Individualism	-.33[.51] (.04)	.71[.55] (.08)	.95[.50] (.12)	-.82[.63] (-.07)	-.09[.60] (-.01)	.40[.56] (.04)
Party ID	.17[.30] (.03)	.62[.33] (.12)	.51[.30] (.11)	.32[.37] (.06)	1.53[.36] (.32)	1.08[.33] (.23)
Liberal/ Conservative	.15[.34] (.03)	.45[.36] (.08)	.35[.35] (.06)	.47[.43] (.07)	-.70[.42] (-.12)	-.31[.38] (-.06)
Fundamentalist Protest. Sect	.19[.29] (.04)	-.62[.30] (-.12)	.23[.29] (.05)	.78[.35] (.14)	-.54[.34] (-.10)	.07[.32] (.01)
Church Attendance	.19[.29] (.05)	-.29[.30] (-.07)	.30[.28] (.08)	-.09[.34] (-.01)	-.20[.32] (-.05)	.05[.30] (.01)
Fundamentalist Relig. Beliefs	.03[.34] (.01)	-.09[.35] (-.02)	-.31[.33] (-.07)	-.24[.40] (-.05)	.22[.38] (.05)	.33[.36] (.07)
Gender (female)	-.11[.18] (-.04)	.06[.19] (.02)	-.34[.18] (-.11)	-.29[.22] (-.08)	-.83[.20] (-.25)	-.30[.19] (-.09)
Race (nonwhite)	-.86[.35] (-.16)	-.61[.36] (-.11)	-.45[.34] (-.08)	-.63[.43] (-.09)	-1.03[.41] (-.17)	-.06[.39] (-.01)
Age	.007[.006] (.08)	.007[.006] (.06)	.007[.006] (.08)	.002[.007] (.02)	-.002[.006] (-.02)	-.009[.006] (-.09)
Education	.11[.04] (.17)	.01[.02] (.02)	.02[.04] (.03)	-.07[.05] (-.10)	-.01[.04] (-.01)	-.03[.04] (-.04)
Income	.001[.005] (.02)	.005[.006] (.04)	.003[.006] (.03)	.001[.007] (.00)	-.10[.006] (-.09)	.003[.006] (.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	.24	.26	.21	.18	.24	.16

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets; standardized coefficients are in parentheses below. All dependent variables are coded so that high scores are more "conservative" responses. The range of possible responses to each dependent variable is 1 to 7.

TABLE 6  
RACIAL EVALUATIONS

	Blacks	Working Class Blacks	Black Politicians	Black Young People	Black Activists	Civil Rights Leaders	Black Militants
Morality	13.4 [6.0] (.14)	15.7 [7.1] (.16)	12.5 [7.1] (.13)	19.6 [7.1] (.20)	20.6 [7.3] (.20)	30.0 [6.1] (.30)	34.9 [9.2] (.26)
Equality	13.4 [6.0] (.14)	5.7 [6.4] (.05)	3.2 [6.2] (.03)	2.6 [6.3] (.03)	6.2 [6.5] (.06)	21.1 [5.6] (.22)	6.3 [8.3] (.05)
Individualism	1.3 [5.7] (.01)	-7.1 [6.1] (-.07)	2.1 [6.0] (.02)	1.9 [6.1] (.02)	5.5 [6.2] (.05)	1.5 [5.3] (.02)	11.8 [7.9] (.08)
Party ID	1.3 [5.7] (.02)	4.5 [3.6] (.09)	2.9 [3.5] (.06)	6.3 [3.5] (.12)	-2.3 [3.6] (-.04)	-0.0 [3.1] (-.00)	5.2 [3.6] (.07)
Liberal/ Conservative	-3.2 [3.8] (-.05)	-4.0 [4.1] (-.06)	-4.2 [4.0] (-.07)	-5.4 [4.1] (-.08)	-5.2 [4.2] (-.07)	2.1 [3.5] (.04)	-5.9 [5.3] (-.07)
Fundamentalist Protest. Sect	7.9 [3.2] (.15)	2.7 [3.3] (.05)	8.8 [3.2] (.17)	7.6 [3.2] (.15)	4.2 [3.5] (.07)	-.7 [2.9] (-.01)	2.1 [4.4] (.02)
Church Attendance	6.5 [3.2] (.15)	4.9 [3.3] (.11)	3.5 [3.3] (.08)	5.5 [3.6] (.12)	.9 [3.5] (.01)	-.1 [2.9] (-.00)	9.6 [4.4] (.16)
Fundamentalist Relig. Beliefs	3.7 [3.8] (.07)	5.8 [4.0] (.12)	8.9 [3.9] (.17)	10.1 [3.9] (.20)	3.9 [4.1] (.07)	6.4 [3.5] (.13)	6.8 [5.2] (.09)
Gender (female)	7.6 [2.0] (.22)	.4 [2.2] (.01)	-.3 [2.1] (-.01)	1.8 [2.1] (.05)	2.1 [2.2] (.05)	-.2 [1.9] (-.00)	3.7 [2.8] (.08)
Race (nonwhite)	3.7 [3.9] (.06)	7.3 [4.1] (.12)	7.4 [3.9] (.12)	9.3 [3.9] (.15)	12.6 [4.3] (.18)	20.4 [3.5] (.33)	16.8 [5.3] (.20)
Age	-.01[.06] (-.01)	-.06[.07] (-.06)	.02[.07] (.02)	-.09[.07] (-.08)	-.16[.07] (-.14)	.02[.06] (.02)	-.22[.09] (-.14)
Education	1.42[.42] (.20)	-.13[.43] (-.01)	-.17[.42] (-.02)	-.07[.42] (-.01)	.58[.47] (.07)	.99[.38] (.14)	-.39[.58] (-.04)
Income	-.02[.07] (-.01)	.01[.07] (.00)	-.11[.06] (-.09)	-.00[.01] (-.00)	-.17[.07] (-.14)	.03[.06] (.03)	-.22[.09] (-.14)
R <sup>2</sup>	.21	.09	.14	.17	.20	.30	.22

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets; standardized regression coefficients are in parentheses below. All dependent variables are feeling thermometer scores ranging from 0 to 100.

TABLE 7

## RACIAL ISSUES

	(1 to 7) Government Aid to Minorities	(1 to 7) Busing	(+1 to -1) School Integration	(+1 to -1) Buy House	(+1 to -1) Job Rights	(+1 to -1) Equal Rights
Morality	-1.96[.58] (-.22)	-1.37[.53] (-.19)	-.37[.18] (-.15)	-.47[.17] (-.20)	-.29[.18] (-.12)	.02[.14] (.01)
Equality	-3.04[.52] (-.34)	-.87[.48] (-.11)	-.58[.16] (-.23)	-.45[.16] (-.19)	-.68[.16] (-.27)	-.34[.12] (-.17)
Individualism	.59[.49] (.07)	.65[.46] (.08)	.06[.16] (.02)	.03[.16] (.01)	.33[.15] (.13)	.32[.12] (.17)
Party ID	.31[.30] (.06)	-.41[.28] (-.10)	.07[.09] (.05)	.05[.09] (.04)	.01[.09] (.01)	.15[.08] (.14)
Liberal/ Conservative	.14[.34] (.02)	.36[.33] (.07)	.24[.10] (.15)	-.03[.10] (-.02)	.01[.10] (.01)	.15[.08] (.12)
Fundamentalist Protest. Sect	-.20[.28] (-.04)	.43[.26] (.11)	-.10[.08] (-.08)	.06[.08] (.04)	.08[.08] (.05)	.03[.07] (.03)
Church Attendance	.07[.28] (.02)	-.03[.25] (-.01)	-.04[.08] (-.03)	-.03[.08] (-.03)	-.07[.08] (-.05)	.01[.07] (.01)
Fundamentalist Relig. Beliefs	-.43[.32] (-.09)	-.01[.30] (-.00)	-.11[.09] (-.08)	-.01[.10] (-.01)	-.12[.10] (-.09)	.02[.08] (.02)
Gender (female)	.06[.18] (.02)	.13[.16] (.05)	-.03[.05] (-.03)	.00[.05] (.00)	-.01[.05] (-.01)	.00[.04] (.00)
Race (nonwhite)	-1.17[.34] (-.34)	-1.10[.32] (-.21)	-.22[.10] (-.13)	-.29[.10] (-.18)	-.25[.10] (-.15)	-.09[.08] (-.07)
Age	-.019[.006] (-.19)	.008[.005] (.09)	-.002[.002] (-.06)	-.001[.002] (-.04)	-.001[.002] (-.02)	-.000[.001] (-.01)
Education	-.08[.04] (-.12)	-.09[.03] (-.16)	.00[.01] (.01)	.01[.01] (.04)	-.02[.01] (-.09)	.00[.01] (.01)
Income	.003[.006] (.02)	.000[.005] (.00)	.000[.001] (.01)	.002[.002] (.07)	.002[.001] (.07)	-.001[.001] (-.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	.34	.20	.20	.16	.21	.17

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets; standardized regression coefficients are in parentheses below. All dependent variables are coded so that high scores are more "conservative" responses. The range of possible responses is given above each dependent variable name.

TABLE 8  
CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS

	Reagan	Bush	Mondale	Ferraro	Reagan- Mondale	Jackson
Morality	-13.1 [8.1] (-.08)	-11.7 [7.8] (-.09)	25.4 [7.9] (.21)	31.3 [8.8] (.24)	-38.5 [12.4] (-.17)	7.6 [9.0] (.06)
Equality	-36.4 [7.7] (-.24)	-19.1 [7.1] (-.14)	14.5 [7.2] (.12)	27.2 [8.2] (.20)	-50.9 [11.3] (-.22)	23.2 [8.1] (.18)
Individualism	10.2 [7.2] (.07)	3.8 [6.7] (.03)	-3.4 [6.9] (-.02)	-4.5 [7.6] (-.03)	13.6 [10.7] (.06)	8.8 [7.8] (.06)
Party ID	34.5 [4.3] (.42)	33.3 [3.9] (.46)	-23.8 [4.0] (-.36)	-20.2 [4.5] (-.28)	58.3 [6.3] (.47)	-10.1 [4.5] (-.15)
Liberal/ Conservative	7.9 [4.9] (.08)	8.8 [4.6] (.10)	2.6 [4.6] (.03)	.5 [5.1] (.01)	5.2 [7.2] (.04)	-2.8 [5.2] (-.03)
Fundamentalist Protest. Sect	8.9 [4.0] (.10)	7.9 [3.7] (.11)	1.3 [3.7] (.02)	4.2 [4.2] (.05)	7.5 [5.9] (.06)	5.9 [4.4] (.08)
Church Attendance	-5.6 [4.0] (-.08)	1.6 [3.7] (.02)	6.7 [3.7] (.12)	.8 [4.2] (.01)	-12.3 [5.9] (-.12)	.8 [4.2] (.01)
Fundamentalist Relig. Beliefs	3.9 [4.7] (.05)	2.2 [4.3] (.03)	-3.0 [4.4] (-.04)	-1.0 [4.9] (-.01)	7.0 [6.9] (.06)	-.9 [5.0] (-.01)
Gender (female)	1.3 [2.6] (.03)	1.3 [2.3] (.02)	.5 [2.4] (.01)	1.6 [2.7] (.03)	.8 [3.8] (.01)	1.9 [2.7] (.04)
Race (nonwhite)	-9.5 [4.9] (-.09)	-6.4 [4.6] (-.07)	6.1 [4.6] (.08)	-4.3 [5.2] (-.05)	-15.6 [7.2] (-.10)	19.5 [5.2] (.23)
Age	-.08 [0.08] (-.05)	-.02 [0.08] (-.01)	.10 [0.07] (.08)	-.02 [0.09] (-.02)	-.18 [0.12] (-.07)	-.04 [0.09] (-.02)
Education	-.05 [0.52] (-.00)	.19 [0.48] (.02)	.31 [0.49] (.03)	.94 [0.55] (.09)	-.36 [0.76] (-.02)	.39 [0.55] (.04)
Income	.16 [0.08] (.09)	.08 [0.08] (.05)	-.06 [0.07] (-.04)	.09 [0.09] (.06)	.23 [0.12] (.08)	-.13 [0.09] (-.08)
R <sup>2</sup>	.48	.44	.28	.27	.51	.21

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets; standardized regression coefficients are in parentheses below. Dependent variables are feeling thermometer scores ranging from 0 to 100 except for Reagan-Mondale which is the difference in feeling thermometer scores ranging from -100 to +100.