Measuring Candidate Qualities: Some Preliminary Thoughts

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The effort by the NES to measure public attitudes about the qualities of candidates as individuals since 1980 has been a move in the right direction, but I would argue that we need to go further in that direction if we want to better understand the dynamics of public opinion and vote choice. The move from a party-centered to a candidate-centered electoral process makes this even more important, as voters rely more heavily (or at least seem to rely more heavily) on their judgments about the candidates to make choices.

Kinder (1986) shows quite clearly, that "Americans judge Presidents substantially by standards of character." His study, based on a pretest of the 1984 NES study carried out in 1983 and focusing on responses to the trait questions currently used by the NES, finds that the public "appears to reach sensible verdicts, and not about character in general, but about competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy in general." (p. 242) Similarly, Miller and his colleagues (1986) find that candidate-directed comments to the open-ended like-dislike questions are stable and influential. And Rahn and her colleagues (1990) argue that "forming assessments of the professional and personal qualities of candidates plays a central role in determining the final vote decision." (p. 154). Furthermore, they argue the candidate appraisal process is a comparative one (a point I will return to shortly).

Finally, in this regard, we should note that the candidate-centered nature of contemporary campaigns, with candidates stressing their personal qualities, and media coverage also focusing on candidate qualities, means that citizens will have readily available information about the "kinds of people" running for office. One look at the TV ads for the recently concluded election campaign shows that candidates think that it is important for them to stress these personal qualities (either positively concerning themselves or negatively concerning their opponent) when appealing to voters. And that, in turn, may prime voters to think about candidates in that way. (See Iyengar and Kinder, 1987) Or it may make such information the most readily available for citizens to use as we would expect in either an impression-based model (Lodge and Stroh, 1993) or "top of the head reasoning" model (Zaller, 1992) of public attitude formation.

My own experience with in-depth interviews made it clear to me that judgments about the qualities of individuals is important for people as they try to make sense of the political world. In the summer and fall of 1986, I conducted a series of in-depth interviews

with a group of citizens chosen at random from the phone book in the Utica, New York area. The study was inductive in nature, designed to draw out people's perceptions of the political world and discover how they tried to make sense of the political world around them. One of the most striking things I found was the way in which many people seemed to structure their political thinking around what I called "styles" of politics. Many of these people, I argued, made sense of the political world by looking for candidates or policies which fit certain styles. And I contrasted these individuals with those who took a more "policy-oriented" approach to the political world, looking for policies they thought would work and individual leaders who supported those policies. Most individuals, I noted, had some mixture of these two approaches. Those with stylistic approaches did have opinions on policies and those with policy approaches did have opinions about styles. But in judging political leaders or explaining how particular policies were likely to be solved, some relied heavily on policy, others relied heavily on style. And those who relied heavily on style looked at political leaders primarily in terms of their qualities as individuals. In discussing this pattern of thinking (Sanders, 1990), I wrote:

Stylistic notions of politics are an attempt to make sense of a complicated and overwhelming world. It is hard to know whether or not a particular policy proposal is likely to work. It is hard to figure out which expert to listen to. For many people, as we have seen, politics is filled with ambiguity and uncertainty. But everyone knows people in their own lives who have succeeded and who have failed. They see, through their own experience, what kinds of approaches work and which do not. And that often allows them to view politics in stylistic terms as well. Drawing on their own experiences, they look for political leaders or policies which express the kinds of styles they think are likely to succeed.

Stylistic notions of politics, then, are very performance oriented. Most of the people with such an orientation relied heavily on the success or failure of a policy to "prove" that the proper style had been followed. Paradoxically, style may be easy to judge because people can relate it to their own experiences, but at the same time it is extremely difficult to judge because it is hard to know if people actually act according to the "proper" style. And thus, judgments about the success or failure of political figures is important in validating style judgments. If the economy seems to be going well, that is because Ronald Reagan is acting in the proper way. He must have the correct style. In contrast, as we shall see,

policy oriented individuals are much less performance oriented. They do not focus on the general success or failure of a political leader or policy. Rather, they focus on the direction that policy has taken. Stylistic individuals are much more retrospective in a general sense. If things go well, positive style judgments are made, if not, negative judgments follow. ...

...To some extent, each individual has his or her own particular vision of style. And thus, every individual may have a relatively unique pattern of political thinking, especially when you combine the basic style/policy orientation differences with the other orientations that we have seen are important in shaping people's ideas about the political world. Still, it was possible to find a number of common patterns. In fact, the sixteen stylistically oriented individuals could be broken down into four different patterns of political thinking.

The most common of these patterns was what I call "macho politics." This pattern was present in six people, Al Chambliss, Carl Figueroa, John Guidry, Bert Jackson, Amy Tidrow and Gus White. For these people, what is important is being tough. Probably the purest example was John. When I asked him what he liked about President Reagan, he replied, "his sternness." And when I asked him what he had thought of Walter Mondale in the 1984 election, he said: "I don't think he was, just in some ways, I just don't think he was powerful enough. I think, more or less, just his personality. I think he was a little laid back, lax. Where Reagan was a little bit more outgoing. And another thing that lead me to my vote was Reagan's success in his four years before."

Similarly, when I asked him about Governor Cuomo he sald:

You know, at first I didn't like Cuomo. But some of the things that he's starting to put into place I think are really helping the community as a whole or the state as a whole. I hated the seat belt law to begin with. But now I just do it instamatically. It really doesn't matter. And I really do think it was a good law. ... I think he's done a super job. I think what proves him strong is issues no one else was willing to touch, he's touched. And that's the same thing as Reagan on the abortion issue. And not as far as willing to touch it, but given his views, the abortion issue and Cuomo, and Cuomo on the seat belt law and also the alcohol, raising the drinking age.

Strength is the key. Both a conservative Republican President and a liberal Democratic Governor fit the bill. The proof is in their performance in office. Since things are going well, the importance of strength is confirmed. But in John, strength goes beyond just a judgment of leaders. It also is reflected in his approach to political issues. He feels we should "get tough" in Nicaragua. He feels Star Wars should be "mandatory, not in a bargain," with the Russians. He argues that we should get tough with welfare recipients and not give things to them, and that the way to fight the crime problem is "to charge up the chairs." He even sees abortion as a matter of being tough. He would allow abortion in a case of rape because there the women had no choice. But in any other case:

If a girl goes out and gets pregnant, you know, of her own accord, I would not grant her an abortion ... because you know, making a decision is part of being a person. You know, she should, I think down the road, it will make her a better person for it. ... You have to live with your decisions. If you get another job and you make a wrong decision, you can't abort it. That's a decision. I think the same thing should be done with sexuality courses. You have'em, and you get pregnant, that's a decision you made.

Being strong is the key. It is a matter of style, and that style is reflected in how John Judges both political figures and political issues. The other five people with macho politics patterns show similar positions. Bert Jackson, for example, as I noted in chapter three, argues that it is a good thing for a leader to be ruthless. That helped Richard Nixon succeed. Similarly, in comparing Reagan and Carter, Bert noted: "But Carter was just so lacksidasical. He couldn't do this. He couldn't do that. Reagan was going to straighten the country out. They needed someone who wasn't a wimp. They needed someone with some backbone. They wanted to restore pride in America."

And Amy Tidrow noted that she liked President Reagan because: "He doesn't keep going back and forth, back and forth, like some other presidents have. Not that I really am too knowledgeable about political activity before this. I think he definitely sticks to what he thinks."

And Carl Figueroa also compared Reagan's sternness to Carter's "wishy washy" approach to politics. Too, Carl's long discussion of the Vietnam War and how its outcome helped spark his lifelong interest in international affairs was a lament over the fact that we

had not been strong enough in that situation. It was a war we should have won, and would have won if we had been tough enough. (pp. 151-154)

The point is, that for many individuals I talked with, politics seemed to make sense mostly in terms of the traits or qualities of individuals (or policies).

As noted above, this study was meant to be inductive, to generate hypotheses about how people think about politics. I did make some limited attempts to measure and test these hypotheses using NES data. But, in part, it has been my frustration with the limits of the measures which we do have which led to my sending in the memo which prompted this paper.

The most complete attempt I made to get a fuller sense of public judgments of candidate personal qualities was set out in what I considered a not very successful paper I wrote for the 1991 APSA meeting. In that paper, I worked with the responses to the openended questions about people's dislikes of both the parties and the candidates in the 1988 election. As I described in that paper (Sanders 1991):

First I looked at the responses to the pre-election survey questions which asked "Is there anything in particular about Mr. Bush (Mr. Dukakis) that might make you want to vote for (against) him? What is it?" and "Is there anything In particular you like (dislike) about the Democratic (Republican) Party? What is that?" Each question allowed up to five responses, which meant respondents had up to forty comments (ten likes and dislikes for each of the candidates and each of the parties). I added up the number of stylistic and policy references that each made. (Examples will be outlined shortly) If the total was approximately equal (within two), they were coded as "mixed," if there was a tendency to respond in more stylistic or policy terms, they were coded appropriately, and if there were no answers to any of these questions, or their responses were ambiguous in these terms, they were coded as "unclear."

I then used the same procedure to code the open-ended responses in the post-election survey. Here, I combined the responses to three sets of questions: "Was there anything in particular that you liked about [Name], the Democratic (Republican) candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives? What was that?"; "Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for? What are those differences?"; and "What sorts of things do you have in mind when you say

someone's political views are liberal (conservative)? Up to five responses were coded for each of the like and dislike House candidate items, up to six responses were coded for the party difference question, and up to three responses were coded for the meaning of liberalism and three for the meaning of conservatism for a possible total of thirty-two references.

Stylistic references included observations such as "They are not tough enough." Or, "He spends money foolishly." (with no further elaboration as to what kinds of policies might be foolish), or "she's smart. She knows what she's doing." In addition, references to support for particular groups or empathy with particular groups, with no additional explanation as to what that support or empathy might entail in a policy sense were also counted as stylistic. (For example, "They are for poor people.") This was done because my indepth interviews indicated that those with stylistic conceptions of politics often made vague, amorphous references to group allegiances in talking about why particular styles were good or bad. (This was particularly true of those who looked for a compassionate style as something that they wanted to see.) Those with policy orientations, on the other hand, usually had some more specific policies in mind when thinking about group allegiances. Of course, in my interviews, I was able to follow up these groups references. If someone said that "The Democrats are for the poor." I could ask what that meant. These questions, unfortunately for my purposes, were not followed up in that way, which means I had to rely on people voluntarily explaining what they meant by there references. When they did not do so, I chose to count them as stylistic. The result of this is that I would expect that I may be overestimating, to some extent, the number of stylistic references that people have. But that kind of decision is an almost inevitable consequence of trying to adapt a scheme which grew out of a series of in-depth interviews to the conversations that occurred in a very different context.

Policy references, obviously, included any mention of specific policies as a reason for liking or disliking candidates or parties or as what it meant to be liberal or conservative. "They spend too much money on the military," or "They are for poor people. They give more money to food stamps and welfare," or "He is pro-choice," are examples of policy references.

Unclear references included simple declarations such as "I always vote Democratic." Or "He is the best candidate." Similarly, if a candidate or party is liked (or disliked) because he or she or it "is liberal" (or conservative) with no explanation of what that entails.

that was also counted as "unclear." Obviously, if the reference was explained, the explanation was used to code the reference. On the other hand, those few people who made a brief reference to someone or party being "socialist" had those references counted as policy references. Again, my in-depth interviews found that people often found liberalism or conservatism to be a matter of style, not policy, so without further explanation, such references were treated as ambiguous. References to socialism, however, inevitably involved a policy dimension. (See Sanders 1989 for a more complete discussion of stylistic and policy conceptions of liberalism and conservatism, and see Tetlock, 1983, 1984, 1986 for a look at why "stylistic" differences between liberals and conservatives may, in fact, exist, and, therefore, why people who make such distinctions may not be "misunderstanding" these terms.)

Finally, I should mention references to spending and saving. When such references were made in a broad sense (or in terms of "thrift" or "waste"), I counted them as stylistic references. When people said that we spend too much money without explaining where, that was taken to be a reference to a way of approaching problems, not a particular policy response. Again, my in-depth interviews found that policy oriented people tended not to make blanket statements about us spending too little or too much money. And, in fact, if you look at public attitudes on spending issues, very few people support across the board spending cuts (or increases). (See Sanders, (1988)) Most of the public likes to spend in some areas, but wants to cut back spending in other areas. They think we spend, for example, too much money on welfare or the military, but not enough on education or homelessness. And when they are thinking about things in a policy sense, they tend to make these distinctions. On the other hand, when thinking about politics in a stylistic sense. many people think about whether or not individuals or parties (or liberals or conservatives) have a tendency to be too tight or too loose with money. This is a matter of style, of approaches to politics, not a specific policy view (at least in most places). When these people say that someone has a tendency to spend too much money and that is why they do not like that person, it does not mean they oppose that individual's proposal to increase spending in a particular area. Rather, it is a judgment based on a general approach to issues involving government resources. (We like or dislike people or groups because they tend to be too generous, or not generous enough with money). Again, the lack of follow-up questions on these issues means that some people may be misclassified, but my experience with in-depth discussions with individuals leads me to

believe that coding the references in this way is more accurate than calling all such references "policy" references or coding them as "ambiguous."

These two separate variables from the pre and post election survey were then combined into a single variable. Those with two stylistic responses or with one stylistic response and one response which was either mixed or unclear were coded as "1". Those with one stylistic and one policy response, or with two mixed or one mixed response and one unclear response were coded as "2". Those with one policy response and one response which was either mixed or unclear and those with two policy responses were coded as "3". Those with two unclear responses were treated as missing. ... Approximately 60% of the public had a stylistic orientation, 25% had a policy orientation and the rest were mixed.

I also created more limited codes looking only at people's responses to the question about candidates, but I found that there was not enough information to create a useful scale. Attempting to code by the kind of style people might be attracted to did not yield enough information as the lack of follow-up questions often made it impossible to get the full meaning of what people were saying. And simply coding into a "style/policy" scheme using this question did not seem to make sense. My in-depth interviews indicated that this was an approach to politics in general, not simply to candidates, so it seemed to make sense to combine all the information into a single measure.

I ran some simple regression analysis using evaluations of the candidates with feeling thermometer responses as the dependent variables and a series of measures of issue proximity, partisanship, retrospective evaluations, and the candidate trait measures, separately for those with stylistic and policy orientations. While there was some suggestion that candidate evaluations were different for people with different orientations, the results were far from conclusive. (I would be happy to provide the details and results of these regressions for anyone who wants to see them, but as they clearly were inconclusive, in the sense that they showed some tendencies to support the kind of distinctions my in-depth interviews led me to expect, but not strong enough support to allow any firm conclusions, I have not included them here). I also tried a number of different schemes weighting responses in different ways and taking into account factors such as a willingness of citizens to place candidates on issue or trait scales. But in the end I concluded that "it may, in fact, be that we need to experiment with the

construction of survey instruments that would allow us to better tap these different orientations." (p. 15) While I could get a sense of whether or not people tended to rely on style (or personal qualities) when making evaluations, it did not seem possible to get any more detailed sense of what particular styles seemed to matter.

Similarly, the current measures of traits and emotional responses clearly do allow us to begin to get at the relationship between feelings about candidates as individuals. For example, only 19% of those who said Bush made them angry voted for him in 1992, compared with 53% of those who did not say he had made them angry. While for Clinton, 20% of those he had angered voted for him, compared with 59% of those he had not angered. (As I proceed with suggestions for improvement below, I will detail other examples of the usefulness of these measures.)

There is something here. These traits and emotional responses do matter. But I think we can do much better. First, I think a simple open-ended question asking people the most important qualities (analogous to the most important problem question) they look for in a President would be very useful. The most important issue question is quite useful in helping us to make sense of how much issues matter to voters. We have used that question to track the concerns of voters. And we also can see that voters with different concerns may support different candidates. (For example, see Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1994, chapter 6). Such information about candidate qualities, I think, would also be useful. I would expect we would find that Clinton and Bush supporters, for example, would be concerned with different candidate qualities. (Of course there may be "projection" problems here, with people deciding which qualities are important based on who they plan to vote for for other reasons. But I do not think these problems would be any greater than they are for issue questions. People do vote for candidates who they admit are not close to them on some of the issues, just as they vote for people who they say lack certain qualities they prefer. A simple look at the distribution of responses on the traits questions shows this to be true. Only 48% of the public felt that "moral" described Clinton extremely well or quite well, and only 51% said "honest" described him extremely or quite well. In fact, of those who felt that "moral" was a better description of Bush than Clinton - and I will return to the issue of comparative judgments shortly - only 53% voted for Bush. - Perot's presence does complicate these simple distinctions as 20% of those who felt Bush was more moral voted for him, while 27% voted for Clinton. While clearly some projection will

occur, most people, the evidence seems to indicate, can make these distinctions.)

In a similar vein, we might want an open-ended question more focused on the qualities of the candidates. Rather than asking "Is there anything in particular about Mr. Bush that might make you want to vote for him?", I think we might learn more if we asked something like, "when you think about Mr. Clinton as a potential president, is there anything about him which you particularly like or dislike?" Coding open-ended questions is never fun - especially when you don't have graduate students to do it for you!!! - but I think a more focused question like this would yield more fruitful responses if we want to examine what it is about candidates as individuals that they like and dislike. And unlike the forced choice trait questions, the open-ended questions can give us a sense of what qualities seem to be on people's minds at the time they are being interviewed.

Second, my in-depth interviews seemed to indicate that many of these kinds of evaluations are comparative in nature. (As noted above, Rahn and her colleagues, (1990), also come to this conclusion.) I might find Clinton and Bush to both be "intelligent" or a "good leader," but what matters is which one I find more "leaderlike" or "intelligent." I think we can improve our measures by either making them more explicitly comparative or by allowing more response categories to spread out the distribution of opinion on these measures. If we look, for example, at the trait measures in 1992, there is only one trait, "cares about people like me" where fewer than 33% of the public sees no difference between the candidates in this quality. (That is, at least 33% said the trait described the two candidates equally well, putting them at the same place on the four point scale we allow them to choose from. See Table 1.) And that was also the only trait where less than 74% of the public placed Bush and Clinton more one position away from each other when responding to the question of how well each of these traits described the two candidates.

In spite of this lack of variance in a constructed comparative measure, comparative measures do quite well in predicting vote choice. Table 2 shows the percentage of those preferring Clinton on a particular trait who voted for Clinton. (Again, the presence of Perot complicates these matters, as some of those who preferred Clinton to Bush may have rated Perot even higher, but the pattern is still quite clear.) I also constructed a composite measure adding up the number of these traits which a citizen said described Bush or Clinton either "extremely well" or "quite well". (See Table 3). If we take a

comparative measure, again, the results are clear (See Table 4). Comparative judgments are crucial. And I think we would be able to understand more with questions which allowed even clearer distinctions to be made. In that regard, I would want to explore two possible changes. One would be to ask explicitly comparative questions, for example, "Do you think "honest" (or any of the other traits) better describes Mr. Bush or Mr. Clinton or does it describe them equally well? (Perhaps with a follow-up question asking if the difference is a strong or weak difference). Alternatively, we might still ask about the candidates separately, but use a seven-point scale akin to the seven point scales we ask on the issue questions, to allow for greater variation of response. (Run the scale from 1 "not well at all" to 4 "moderately well" to 7 "extremely well"). Now it may be that we find such a scale asks people to make distinctions they do not actually make and that we end up with a measure which does not distinguish as well as the simple four point response scale we now have. But given the importance these judgments seem to have on vote choice and, I would argue, the importance of the comparative nature of these judgments, I think it is worth exploring.

I am less sure of what to do about measuring the emotional component of candidate evaluation. Again, it is clear that we do respond emotionally to candidates. One listen to talk radio illustrates The visceral emotional quality of Rush Limbaugh and his followers to President Clinton, for example, reminds me of the emotional response my family always had to Richard Nixon! But I am a bit skeptical of our ability to measure emotion very well with a cognitive instrument such as a survey. Still, even with that, the emotion questions we now ask do make distinctions. We currently ask if the candidates have ever made the respondent feel angry, hopeful, afraid or proud, as well as the general "feeling thermometers" which are an attempt to tap more general emotional responses. As noted above, people's responses to these emotions questions do correlate with vote choices. The positive emotions lead to a greater likelihood of support, the negative ones to a lack of support. (See Table 5) And again, comparative measures are particularly good, but limited due to the small number of responses allowed. (I created a composite measure of the number of "positive" emotional responses to Bush and Clinton running from zero to four, An individual got one point for saying Bush made them feel proud or hopeful and not feel angry or afraid. I then created a composite measure comparing the Clinton to Bush scales. 44% of voters had a more positive emotional response to Clinton, and 82% of them voted for him. Similarly, of the 41% of voters who had a more positive

emotional response to Bush, 70% voted for him. Still, I think we may be able to improve these questions.

Especially if we have an incumbent President, asking if the candidate has ever provoked such a response may be misleading. may not like President Clinton, but I may have felt proud of his response to Haiti. Or I may like him in general, but I may have gotten angry with him for his health care proposal. Perhaps a question along the lines of: "If Mr. Clinton wins the Presidential election this coming November, do you think that would make you very angry, moderately angry, a little bit angry or not at all angry." The problem, however, with such questions, is that they are likely to simply be another way of asking vote choice. (We won't be angry or afraid if the candidate we support wins, but we will be proud and hopeful). More promising, it seems to me, would be to change the frame of reference of these questions from "have they ever made you feel" to "does he make you feel." Again, there may be too much projection at work here to make such questions useful, and it may be that the frames of reference we currently use - "has he ever made you feel" - is the best we can do.

Comparative questions present the same problem. "Which of the candidates makes you feel more angry" seems much more prone to projection effects than do such comparative questions on issues or traits. There may be some people who admit to voting for Bill Clinton even though he angers them more than George Bush does, but I would not expect the number to be very large. Thus, more indirect comparative measures such as the simple scale noted above, or more fined tuned comparisons based on answers to questions with more categories (such as a scale running from 1, not at all angry, to 7, extremely angry, etc.) may be the only way to get at such comparisons. Providing for a broader range of responses (a five point or seven point response set) may allow for construction of fuller, more comparative measures.

Similarly, we may wish to expand the types of emotional responses we ask about, though I am less certain here what to ask about. "Happy" and "sad" come to mind as two other possibilities, but I am uncertain as to whether that will get us any additional information. And we also might consider an open-ended question designed to tap into emotional responses to the candidates such as "When you think about Mr. Bush winning this election, how does that make you feel," but I am not sure that this will actually get us a better understanding of the emotional responses people have to candidates. It would have the advantage of allowing people to describe their own emotions without us telling them what those

emotions might be, but I am not sure how well people will actually describe their own emotional responses, nor am I sure how we could, in the end, code such responses in such a way as to make any use of these responses.

As I noted above, in the end, I am skeptical of our ability to tap into these emotional responses particularly well with survey questions anyway. While I do not doubt that we have emotional responses to candidates and that such responses help shape the way we think about these individuals and the choices we make politically, I think there is a limit to what this methodology can do to measure that response. Perhaps others who have explored this issue in more detail than I have will disagree, and I certainly do not claim expertise in such matters, having undertaken only minimal explorations myself. So if others have better ideas, I am open to them. But I think that it may be difficult to gauge anything more than a kind of broad emotional reaction we already can get with the general feeling thermometer questions and the kind of simple composites and relationships we can create with the four emotions we now attempt to measure. I think we will get much more "payoff" by improving our measures of candidate traits along the lines suggested above, and I would, therefore, recommend we focus more of our effort in that area.


I have tried to sketch out briefly how I think we can improve our measure of candidate traits and the emotional responses of citizens to these candidates. Let me conclude by reiterating that I do not think that our current measures are "bad." On the contrary, I think they are, on the whole, pretty good, and I have tried to show how that is so. On the other hand, I do think we can improve them, particularly in the area of candidate traits or qualities. We know that such traits are important when citizens judge candidates, and my own experience with in-depth interviews has convinced me, at least until I see some strong evidence to the contrary, that they are central to how people think about the political world. I also would agree with those who argue that our elections have become more candidate-centered. That, along with the growing importance of television has made, I would argue, candidate qualities more central to the evaluative process. And thus, if we improve our measures in this area, we will improve our ability to understand the dynamics of voter opinion formation and choice. I would urge that we explore ways to improve our sense of which qualities of candidates are important to people, and to better tap into the comparative nature of the judgments that citizens seem to make in these matters.

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TABLE 1
DIFFERENCES IN TRAIT EVALUATIONS

Trait	No Difference	Within One
Intelligence	56%	91%
Knowledge	54%	89%
Compassion	38%	76%
Honest	35%	77%
Moral	34%	74%
Get Things Done	33%	81%
Leadership	33%	79%
Inspiring	33%	78%
Cares About People Like Me	23%	66%

The percentage in the "No difference" column is the percentage of the public rating Clinton and Bush at exactly the same point on the question of how well the appropriate trait describes each candidate. The "within one" column in the percentage placing Bush and Clinton within one place of each other in response to these questions.

TABLE 2

VOTE FOR CLINTON AND TRAIT EVALUATIONS

TRAIT	% RATING CLINTON HIGHER	% VOTING FOR CLINTON
Intelligence	25%	79%
Compassion	42%	79%
Moral	13%	86%
Inspiring	45%	77%
Leadership	37%	83%
Cares About People Like Me	53%	78%
Knowledge	23%	82%
Honesty	28%	84%
Gets Things Done	28%	84%

The second column reports the percentage of voters rating Clinton as having more of the trait in question than Bush. The third column is the percentage of those voters rating Clinton as having more of the trait in question who voted for Clinton.

TABLE 3

COMPOSITE TRAIT MEASURE AND 1992 VOTE

# of traits	% of voters: Bush	% who support Bush	% of voters: Clinton	%who support Clinton
0	4%	4%	6%	19%
1	5%	3%	5%	16%
2	9%	4%	8%	10%
3	9%	5%	9%	10%
4	12%	11%	9%	22%
5	12%	22%	9%	31%
6	10%	27%	9%	47%
7	10%	50%	12%	62%
8	9%	61%	12%	75%
9	19%	82%	22%	86%

For each candidate a scale from zero to nine was created for each respondent. The scale is the number of traits which the respondent said described the candidate "extremely well" or "quite well." (The traits are the same nine traits found in the previous table.) The first column for each candidate reports the number of citizens at that level on the scale. Thus, 19% of the electorate said Bush exhibited all nine of these traits. The second column for each candidate reports the percentage of people at that level who voted for the candidate in question.

TABLE 4

1992 VOTE BY COMPARATIVE TRAIT MEASURE

Vote	Strong Clinton	Moderate Clinton	Neutral	Moderate Bush	Strong Bush
Clinton	89%	73%	41%	14%	6%
Perot	9%	20%	33%	27%	14%
Bush	2%	7%	26%	59%	80%
Total	27%	23%	8%	18%	24%

The comparative trait index was constructed by subtracting the number of traits attributed to Clinton (extremely well or quite well) from the number of traits attributed to Bush. "Strong Clinton" (which make up 27% of the voters - the bottom row of the table) are those who attribute at least four more of these traits to Clinton than to Bush. "Moderate Clinton" represent those who attribute between one and three more of these traits to Clinton. Neutral are those attributing the same number of traits to each candidate. The Bush categories are the same (moderate one to three more, strong, four or more). The percentages are the percentage of voters in the category who voted for the candidate in question.

TABLE 5
VOTE BY EMOTIONAL RESPONSE

VOTE	ANGRY	AFRAID	HOPEFUL	PROUD
Bush	19% (55%)	19% (42%)	50% (52%)	49% (60%)
Clinton	21% (29%)	20% (27%)	74% (54%)	82% (26%)

VOTE	NOT ANGRY	NOT AFRAID	NOT	NOTPROUD
			HOPEFUL	
Bush	53% (45%)	45% (58%)	17% (48%)	12% (40%)
Clinton	59% (71%)	58% (73%)	18% (46%)	36% (74%)

The first percentage is the percentage of voters saying Bush (or Clinton) had made them have the appropriate emotional response who voted for that particular candidate. The number in parentheses is the percentage of voters who fell into that category. Thus, 55% of all voters said that Bush had made them feel angry. 19% of these individuals voted for Bush. Only 29% of all voters said Clinton had made them feel angry. And 21% of them voted for Clinton anyway.

Similarly, in the second half of the table, 45% of the voters said Bush had not made them feel angry, and 53% of them voted for Bush.