Version 01 Codebook ------------------- CODEBOOK INTRODUCTION FILE 1993 PILOT STUDY (1993.PNS) USER NOTE: This file has been converted to electronic format via OCR scanning. As as result, the user is advised that some errors in character recognition may have resulted within the text. AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES 1992-1993 PANEL STUDY ON SECURING ELECTORAL SUCCESS/ THE 1993 PILOT STUDY CODEBOOK ICPSR ARCHIVE NUMBER 6264 BIBLIOGRAPHIC CITATION Publications based on ICPSR data collections should acknowledge those sources by means of bibliographic citations. To ensure that such source attributions are captured for social science bibliographic utilities, citations must appear in footnotes or in the reference section of publications. The bibliographic citation for this data collection is: Rosenstone, Steven J., Donald R. Kinder, Warren E. Miller, and the National Election Studies. AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY: 1992-1993 PANEL STUDY ON SECURING ELECTORAL SUCCESS/1993 PILOT STUDY [Computer file]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer], 1994. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON USE OF ICPSR RESOURCES To provide funding agencies with essential information about use of archival resources and to facilitate the exchange of information about ICPSR participants' research activities, users of ICPSR data are requested to send to ICPSR bibliographic citations for each completed manuscript of thesis abstract. Please indicate in a cover letter which data were used. DATA DISCLAIMER The originall collector of the date, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for interpretations of inferences based upon such uses. TABLE OF CONTENTS Note: >>sections in the codebook introduction and codebook appendix can be navigated in the machine-readable files by searching ">>". INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS (file intpil93.cbk) ---------------------- >> 1993 GENERAL INFORMATION >> 1993 SURVEY CONTENT AND OBJECTIVES >> 1993 STUDY CHARACTERISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION >> CODEBOOK INFORMATION CODEBOOK -------- 1993 variables 1992 variables APPENDICES (file apppil93.cbk) ---------- >> The 1993 Pilot Study Interviewer Debriefing >> 1993 PARTY-CANDIDATE MASTER CODE >> CANDIDATE LISTS FOR THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION >> 1980 Census Definitions >> 1990 Census Definitions >> 1992 Party-Candidate Master Codes >> 1992 Campaign Issues Master Code >> 1992 Candidate Number Codes and Lists >> 1992 Important Problems Master Code >> 1992 Party Differences Master Code >> 1988/1992 Religious Preference Master Codes >> 1980 Census Occupation Code >> 1980 Census Industry Code >> ICPSR Occupation Recodes, 1992 >> 1992 Nationality and Ethnicity Master Code >> 1992 ICPSR State and Country Codes >> Cities with Population Of 25,000 and Over, 1992 >> 1991 Study Background Documents >> 1992 Gulf War Vote >> 1992 Gulf War Code >> Campaign Political Advertisments, 1992 >> 1992 Liberal/Conservative Code >> 1992 Candidate Support Code >> Type of Race, 1992 >> 1992 Sample Ballot Card >> 1992 State Primary Ballot Cards >> 1993 GENERAL INFORMATION The American National Election Studies are conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, under the general direction of Principal Investigators Steven J. Rosenstone, Donald R. Kinder and Warren E. Miller. Santa Traugott is the Director of Studies for the National Election Studies. Giovanna Morchio was the Study Manager for the NES 1993 Pilot Study. The 1992 Pre- and Post-Election Study is the twenty-second in the series of studies of American national elections produced by the Political Behavior Program of the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies. Since 1978 these studies have been conducted under the auspices of National Science Foundation Grants (SOC77-08885, SES-8341310, and SES-8808361) providing long-term support for the National Election studies. The election studies are designed by a National Board of Overseers, the members of which meet several times a year to plan content and administration of the major study components. A number of Pilot Studies have been conducted by the NES, for the purpose of developing new instrumentation. The 1993 Pilot Study is part of this series, which also includes studies conducted in 1979, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1991. Like the traditional time-series studies, the Pilot Studies are ultimately designed by the Board of Overseers, with assistance from the scholarly community in the form of planning committees. Like of all its predecessors (except the 1979 Pilot Study) the 1993 Study respondents are a subset of the previous year's traditional time-series respondents. The Pilot Studies are, therefore, designed as panel studies. Members of the NES Board of Overseers during the planning of the 1993 Pilot Study included: Thomas Mann, The Brookings Institution, Chair; Larry Bartels, Princeton University; Charles Franklin, The University of Wisconsin; Mary Jackman, University of California at Davis, Gary C. Jacobson, University of California, San Diego; David Leege, The University of Notre Dame; Douglas Rivers, Stanford University; Virginia Sapiro, The University of Wisconsin; John Zaller, the University of California, Los Angeles; Warren E. Miller, Arizona State University, ex officio; Donald R. Kinder, and Steven J. Rosenstone, University of Michigan, ex officio. John Zaller chaired the 1993 Pilot Study Planning Committee which included several other Board members (Bartels, Leege, and Jacobson) and three other scholars: Jack Dennis, The University of Wisconsin, Charles Franklin, The University of Wisconsin, and Laura Stoker, University of California, Berkeley. (Franklin joined the Board after the initial Pilot Study planning meeting.) While not officially a member of the Planning Committee, Douglas Strand, of University of California, Berkeley advised the Committee on many aspects of the proposed items on attitudes toward homosexuals and policy about homosexuals. 1993 STUDY DESCRIPTION >> SURVEY CONTENT AND OBJECTIVES Overview The 1993 Pilot Study is the second of a projected three wave study. The 1993 wave was in the field approximately one year after the first wave of the study which is the 1992 Pre- and Post-election study, from which the 1005 cross-section respondents were selected for reinterview in 1993. We anticipate that respondents will be interviewed for a third time as part of the 1994 Election Study. The three-wave study is designed to exploit the special circumstances of the 1992-94 elections: a minority president who is struggling to forge a majority coalition in the face of a strong third-party challenge, and the replacement in 1992 of fully one-quarter of the House of Representatives. Each presents an unique opportunity which we propose to seize through projects that are directed at understanding how electoral coalitions form (and decay) and how new members of the House secure their districts. Additionally, the Pilot Study fulfills its role as the vehicle for testing and developing new instrumentation for the 1994 National Election Study. The Clinton Coalition The 1994 elections present both a substantial opportunity and risk to the Democratic Party. The stakes are high: the party needs to consolidate the gains of 1992 and build a majority coalition. In some ways, the Clinton Administration began this political task from a position of extraordinary weakness. Although Bill Clinton captured a clear majority of the electoral votes, he entered the White House without a clear mandate, winning just a shade over 43 percent of the popular vote. Indeed, early interpretations of the 1992 election have emphasized less that Clinton won the Presidency and more that Bush lost it. At the same time, whether in possession of a popular mandate or not, Clinton came to Washington with significant legislative initiatives in mind. He introduced major proposals on taxes and spending. He appears determined to grapple with health care, not to tinker with it but to reform it fundamentally. Clinton's election has of course meant the return of unified government to the national scene, though early readings suggest that Republican unity in the Senate and Democratic defections from Clinton's proposals may undermine the promises of unified control. Still, there is the prospect of real change: major proposals, passed into law, with the consequences broadly felt throughout the country. From the perspective of coalition maintenance, this is a special political moment, one portentous for the future electoral success not only of the Democratic and Republican Parties but for third party challenges as well (a point we take up immediately below). We want to assess how all this consequential and high-profile political churning intrudes upon Clinton's capacity to hold together and expand his political coalition over the first critical years of his administration. How have each of Clinton's major policy initiatives added or subtracted support from his political coalition? The 1993 Pilot Study re-asks a number of items from the 1992 Study, and adds others, to give as complete a picture as possible of how Clinton is faring with the coalition which elected him. These items are: Evaluation of economy (V937238-937260) approval ratings of several aspects of Clinton's performance in office (V937101-937120) thermometer ratings of Bill and Hillary Clinton (V937130-937138) Who would R vote for if the election were held today (V937161) liberal-conservative placement of Clinton (V937209-937216) traits and affects batteries (V937226-937230, V7267-937270) opinion on NAFTA (V937261-937266) opinion on budget deficit (V937315-937323) From a slightly different angle, the 1992-1994 study, of which the 1993 Pilot Study is the middle piece, is also directed at more fully understanding the Perot phenomenon. That Perot's popularity is a political phenomenon is hardly open to question. Following an eccentric if not quixotic on and off and on again campaign, and in spite of the formidable hurdles which the American system places before third-party candidates, Perot won nearly one in five votes cast in 1992. In this respect, Perot did better than all but one third party candidate since the Civil War split the nation. Perot's pockets are deep enough to finance a continued high public profile. Perot's likely continued presence quickens interest on our part in understanding the maintenance and decay of his coalition as well. Even without the trappings and formal powers of the Presidency, Perot, like Clinton, faces the identical political problem of somehow hanging on to his supporters while recruiting still others as they become disenchanted with the alternatives. To what extent does Perot's continued support rest upon an ideological base? Or upon disenchantment with business as usual, a continuing protest against politics itself? Or upon the failure of government to deal with the economy or the budget deficit? Or should the Perot movement be understood in more personal terms, dependent upon continuing public displays of a winning style and personality? Or, finally, does it turn on contempt for the alternatives? A number of items which attempt to tap the sources and strength of Perot support have been included in the study. They include: Ross Perot and United We Stand feeling thermometers (V937131, V937149, V937150) liberal-conservative placement for Perot (V937220-937221) traits and affects batteries (V937231-937235, V937271-937274) attitudes toward political parties (V937295-937296, V937305,V937366-937370) attitudes toward media, special interests, government in Washington (V937306-V937308) membership in, contact by United We Stand America (V937312-937314) To examine the maintenance and decay of electoral coalitions, we have empaneled the cross-section respondents to the 1992 NES Post-Election Survey, interviewing them again in the fall of 1993, and proposing to interview them one final time in the weeks following the 1994 midterm election. The panel design is a powerful one for several reasons. First, an absolute requirement for a study of electoral coalitions is the successful identification of Clinton, Perot, and Bush voters (and non-voters as well). For Clinton, the immediate political challenge has several aspects: to maintain the support of those who voted for him in 1992; to build support among those who voted for his opponents, especially those who went Perot's way in 1992; and to awaken interest and eventually support among those millions who, in 1992, voted for no one at all. Attempting to assess vote a year or more away from the election, as we would have to do absent a panel design, invites error of the most pernicious sort. For example, citizens who in fact voted for Clinton in 1992 but who have since recoiled in horror at what he has done, might now report that they had voted for Bush. To get this project off the ground, we need to know what citizens did on election day 1992, and to know that, we treat the 1992 NES Survey as a first wave of a panel. Second, coalition maintenance and decay may be a classic case of little detectable movement at the aggregate level obscuring lots of off-setting movement at the individual level, as citizens move in and out of various partisan camps. Determining the fluidity of the Clinton and Perot coalitions can be uncovered with panel evidence. Finally, panel data will also permit the testing of alternative theories of political learning. Whether such theories come from formal, statistical formulations, as in Bayesian models, or from various psychological theories, a claim held in common is that what people absorb from their political experiences depends on their prior beliefs and sentiments. Learning is conditional on what citizens already know. This means that we must have baseline readings on citizens before Clinton's coming to power. The 1992 NES survey of course delivers handsomely on precisely this point. These data tell us what citizens thought in 1992 about the necessity of new taxes, the seriousness of the federal budget deficit, the need for health care reform, the conditions under which women should be permitted to have abortions, whether gays should be allowed to serve in the armed forces, the responsiveness of government institutions, the performance of the major parties, and much, much more. And this means that, having returned to these same citizens in 1993 and 1994, we will be in excellent position to understand in a fine-grained way how electoral coalitions are held together and how they fall apart. Securing the District Due to a combination of re-districting, scandal, and retirement, the 1992 House elections resulted in a dramatic turnover in personnel. More than one-quarter of the House was replaced: 110 new Representatives won in November, the most in nearly half a century This turnover provides an the opportunity of examining the ways in which new members of the House secure their districts against challenge in the next election. For the first time, we can examine the relationship that develops between representatives and their constituents in its formative stages during the first term in office. The advantages of incumbency have been a central theme of research on House elections and on the institution itself. Defections from party-line voting in House elections have increasingly favored the incumbent. These days, incumbent Representatives almost always win, often by overwhelming margins. Despite all the talk about anti-incumbent feelings in 1992, fully 93 percent of House incumbents seeking re-election were returned to office. Taking into account primary election defeats, this figure remains an impressive 88 percent. On the other hand, this re-election rate was the lowest since the Watergate election of 1974 and fell just 2 points short of being the lowest in forty years. Moreover, it does not take into account the unusually large number of representatives who choose not to run again in 1992, some of whom certainly would have been defeated. It is also true that winning incumbents were much more likely to find themselves in close contests in 1992 than in previous years. Still, in the face of re-districting, scandal, and widespread popular disdain for the institution of Congress, incumbents seeking re-election were rarely turned away. Success at under these highly unfavorable conditions testifies to the continuing electoral benefits of incumbency. We know that incumbent advantage accrues quickly: it is well-established, perhaps established in full, by completion of the first term in office. Indeed, a common measure of incumbency advantage is the "sophomore surge:" the gain typically registered in the representative's first re-election try What happens during these first two years? How do newly elected members of the House consolidate their victories? Is the incumbency advantage secured as a result of the actions that members of Congress engage in during their first term of office, or is it secured as a result of their first re-election campaign? As it is typically investigated, the problem is impossible to unravel. The data we rely on are always investigated in the context of an election campaign. Moreover, it is precisely those incumbents who are deepest in trouble at election time who work their district the most. The study we propose here provides a clean test of the inherent (as opposed to campaign-related) advantages of incumbency. Many new members are precarious, and most no doubt believe that they are. Under these circumstances, do in fact new members of the House concentrate their attention and activities on their home district during their first term and, most important, do their constituents take notice? As a general matter, we know next to nothing about the impressions created by Representatives -- whether they are new to Congress or not -- between elections. What in fact happens to the visibility of newly-elected representatives over the critical period of their first term? Do constituents tend to forget about their representatives between elections, and then learn about them again as the next campaign takes off? Or do constituents learn more and more about their representatives as the first term proceeds, a response to what Richard Fenno has called "the permanent campaign?" The 1992-1993-1994 panel data provide sharp tests of the alternative theoretical interpretations of the incumbency advantage. Of the 1005 respondents who make up the 1992 NES post-election cross-section, over a quarter (n=275) resided in congressional districts that sent a new member to Congress in 1992. Thus, the high turnover that occurred in the House in 1992 provides sufficient numbers of respondents to support detailed analysis of the processes by which newly-elected representatives (compared to returning incumbents) shore up their support during their first term in office. The panel design provides efficient measurement of the evolution of new Representatives' reputations among their constituents. With panel evidence in hand, patterns of learning and forgetting and alterations in trust and support, conditional on the views held by constituents before their Representatives went off to Washington, can be traced. The survey included extensive content on evaluations of incumbent members of Congress. Much of the content repeats the now-familiar congressional batteries. Also embedded in the study is an experiment designed to give us more information about whether the use of the ballot card has contributed to over-reporting. Half of the respondents were supplied with the names as well as parties of the candidates for congress when asked for whom they voted. This emulates the ballot card. The other half of the respondents were simply asked whether they voted for the Democrat or the Republican candidate. Recall of candidates running in "this district this past November" (V937121-937129) Thermometer rating of incumbent; recall what job he/she holds? (V937136-937137) Likes/dislikes of incumbent (V937162-937173) Contact with U.S. Representatie incumbent (V937174-937183) Vote for Representative (V937184-937185) Approve of way Representative handling job (V937191-937194) Does R's representative support Clinton's legislative proposals (V937195-937199) Did he/she vote for Clinton's deficit reduction package (V937200-937202) Does Representative do a good job of keeping in touch (V937203) liberal-conservative placement of Representative (V937222-937223) Developing New Instrumentation The design of the 1993 Pilot Study replicates one NES successfully implemented in 1990-91-92 to assess the political impact of the Persian Gulf War. In this design, the odd- year Pilot Study serves double duty as a platform both from which to conduct the second wave of the panel and to carry out the research and development work for the subsequent year's election study. One section of development work (V937371-937422) follows a proposal made by Laura Stoker, to study the interest basis of political attitudes. Questions are asked about perceived interests of several groups (wealthy, poor, middle class, blacks, whites), as well as self and national interest, in three domains: National health insurance (V937374-937384) Affirmative action (V937405-937422) School choice (V937385-937404) Half of the respondents received the questions about affirmative action in lieu of the school choice questions while the other half got the school choice questions instead of those relating to affirmative action. Douglas Strand proposed a number of questions relating to attitudes toward homosexuals and about policies affecting homosexuals. The attitudes toward homosexuals are measured by asking Rs whether: parents should encourage boys to be masculine and girls to be feminine (V937289-937294) homosexuality is a matter of choice (V937336-937339) homosexuals try to seduce non-homosexuals (V937340-937343) the idea of homosexuality disgusting or uncomfortable (V937348-937351) he/she worries about getting AIDS or other disease from homosexuals (V937348-937351) homsexuality is unnatural (V937352-937355) homosexuals have too much/too little influence (V937356-937360) homsexuality is against the will of God (V937361-937365) Attitudes towards policy relating to homosexuals are measured by these items: favor or opppose laws protecting homosexuals from job discrimination (V937324-937327) whether homosexuals should serve in military (V937328-937331) should homosexual couples be allowed to adopt children (V937332-937335) A number of experiments in the survey response also are included in the Pilot Study. These include: Budget package vs. deficit reduction package (V937200) Experiment in wording of the vote choice for Representative question- reading candidate name as well as party, versus reading only party labels (V937185, V937283) Reversing order of self versus political object placement on liberal conservative 7-pt scale (V937205-937219) Certainty probe on liberal-conservative scale; self and other objects (V937208, V937211, V937216, V937219, V937221, V937223) Experiments on nature of followup: strength versus amount (lot, little) (V937263, V937266, V937291, V937294, V937300, V937308) Experiements on length of followups: short versus verbose ((V937102-937104, V7349-937351) order in which groups were presented in the the interest basis of politics section was reversed for half the sample (V937374-937422) >> 1993 STUDY CHARACTERISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION The 1993 Pilot Study was a telephone reinterview of (cross-section) respondents to the NES 1992 Pre- and Post-Election Study. Interviewing was carried out by the Telephone Facility of the Survey Research Center, the Institute for Social Research.  Field period was Sept. 23 --Nov. 24, 1993  Average interview length was 42 minutes  750 interviews were taken, including 4 partials  Response rate was 74.6 percent; cooperation rate was 88.4 percent (See below)  The study was CATI -- there is no paper version of the Questionnaire Response Rate Calculations This is a Panel Study, and response rate calculations are somewhat different than those for an initial contact study, primarily because because there is no "non-sample" category. Every one of the 1005 persons we originally interviewed in the 1992 Post-election study is, by definition, eligible for a reinterview. (1992 respondents who were interviewed in the Pre-election study only were not part of the 1993 study sample.) We reinterviewed 750 of these 1005 respondents to the 1992 study, for a strictly construed reinterview rate of 74.6 percent. 98 respondents from the 1990 Study refused to be reinterviewed. An additional 157 respondents could not cooperate because they were ill or for some other reason physically unable to complete a telephone interview; because they were not locatable; or because they did not have a telephone and did not respond to our requests to call the Telephone Facility. A cooperation rate, which excludes the 157 noninterview cases, is calculated at 88.4 percent. The Telephone Facility and NES staff collaborated on a several step plan to boost response rate and to reduce panel attrition. There were several mailings to the respondents, including a thank-you letter, a respondent report, and an advance contact letter enclosing a small clock as an incentive. The field period was long enough to provide time to track respondents. Persuasion letters were sent, to those who were initially reluctant to participate. An 800-number was set up for respondents to call for further information about the study. In the late stages of interviewing, monetary incentives were offered to 42 reluctant respondents. Finally, the study benefitted from having a highly committed and skilled cadre of interviewers. Interviewer training, pretesting and debriefings The first draft of the questionnaire was pretested by picking at random telephone numbers from local (not Ann Arbor) telephone exchanges. 30 interviewers were taken in this way by a mixture of experienced and new interviewers. Study staff "debriefed" the interviewers on their own and respondents' reactions to each question in the pretest instrument. These pretest interviews were also tape recorded, and new questions were "behavior coded" for more quantitative indications of problems with these questions. A separate debriefing was held for the behavior coders. Information from both of these debriefings (which were contradictory on certain points) was incorporated into the production instrument. Standard practice for an SRC study calls for a study guide, listing study objectives and procedures, as well as any special information that interviewers need to know about specific questions. (A copy of this document, as well as study guides for all previous studies, is available from NES Project Staff.) Prestudy conferences with all interviewers and NES staff and PIs gave an opportunity to train on specific questions, and answer concerns of interviewers. Midway through the interviewing, NES staff and PI met with interviewers to hear directly from them how the study was proceeding and how, in their opinion, new sections of the questionnaire were working. A full report of this debriefing is included in Appendix A. Forms Assignment When the Board began planning for this study, we were budgeted for about 40 minutes of interview time, and a number of experiments were proposed. In order to meet these objectives, respondents were randomly assigned to one of four forms. (Variable 7003 records the form assignment.) Randomization Responses to survey questions can be affected by questions that have been asked previously in the survey. There are many survey questions, like the feeling thermometers, where lists of objects are presented for evaluation by respondents. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify a single order for the items which eliminates response effects. An alternative is to randomize the order in which items on a list are presented to respondents. The CATI system used by the SRC Telephone Facility, AUTOQUEST, has a randomizing function and this was implemented for the feeling thermometer (variables V937130-937136, 937138- 937141). No information as to the order in which the thermometer items were asked for a given respondent was preserved. Congressional District Identification for Movers One of the goals of the multiple advance mailings to the 1992 respondents was to get change of address information from local post offices. When we got information that a respondent had moved, and to where, study staff attempted to determine, from what was known of the respondent's new location, in which congressional district the respondent now lived. The name of the member of Congress for that district was then substituted throughout the questionnaire for the name of the member of Congress who was elected in the district in which the respondent lived at the time of the 1992 interview. In a few cases, the information that the respondent had moved was not elicited until the interview was actually underway. When this happened, the interview continued, using the original member of Congress. Organization and Documentation of the Dataset Data for all of the variables and all of the cases in the first wave of the panel, i.e., the 1992 Pre- and Post-election Study, are included in this dataset. Please note that this means that although there are 750 respondents in the 1993 Pilot Study, there are actually 1005 records in the Pilot dataset; one for each (cross-section) respondent to the 1992 Post-election Study. Respondents in the 1992 study who were not re-interviewed in the 1993 wave are assigned missing data codes on the 1993 variables. Documentation and dataset are available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. ICPSR Member Services may be contacted by phone (313.763- 5010) or by Internet E-Mail (icpsr_netmail@um.cc.umich.edu) for further information. >> CODEBOOK INFORMATION The following example from the 1948 NES study provides the standard format for codebook variable documentation. Note that NES studies which are not part of the Time-Series usually omit marginals and the descriptive content in lines 2-5 (except for variable name). Line 1 ============================== 2 VAR 480026 NAME-R NOT VT-WAS R REG TO VT 3 COLUMNS 61 - 61 4 NUMERIC 5 MD=0 OR GE 8 6 7 Q. 17. (IF R DID NOT VOTE) WERE YOU REGISTERED (ELIGIBLE) 8 TO VOTE. 9 ........................................................... 10 11 82 1. YES 12 149 2. NO 13 14 0 8. DK 15 9 9. NA 16 422 0. INAP., R VOTED Line 2 - VARIABLE NAME. Note that in the codebook the variable name (usually a 'number') does not include the "V" prefix which is used in the release SAS and SPSS data definition files (.sas and .sps files) for all variables including those which do not have 'number' names. For example the variable "VERSION" in the codebook is "VVERSION" in the data definition files. Line 2 - "NAME". This is the variable label used in the SAS and SPSS data definition files (.sas and .sps files). Some codebooks exclude this. Line 3 - COLUMNS. Columns in the ASCII data file (.dat file). Line 4 - CHARACTER OR NUMERIC. If numeric and the variable is a decimal rather than integer variable, the numer of decimal places is also indicated (e.g. "NUMERIC DEC 4") Line 5 - Values which are assigned to missing by default in the Study's SAS and and SPSS data definition files (.sas and .sps files). Line 7 - Actual question text for survey variables or a description of non-survey variables (for example, congressional district). Survey items usually include the question number (for example "B1a.") from the Study questionnaire; beginning in 1996 non-survey items also have unique item numbers (for example "CSheet.1"). Line 9 - A dashed or dotted line usually separates question text from any other documentation which follows. Line 10- When present, annotation provided by Study staff is presented below the question text/description and preceding code values. Lines 11-16 Code values are listed with descriptive labels. Valid codes (those not having 'missing' status in line 5) are presented first, followed by the values described in line 5. For continuous variables, one line may appear providing the range of possible values. A blank line usually separates the 'valid' and 'missing' values. Lines 11-16 Marginals are usually provided for discrete variables. The counts may be unweighted or weighted; check the Study codebook introductory text to determine weight usage.